Independent Random Matching by Podczeck, Konrad & Puzzello, Daniela
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Independent Random Matching
Konrad Podczeck and Daniela Puzzello
October 2009
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27687/
MPRA Paper No. 27687, posted 27. December 2010 11:03 UTC
Independent Random Matching∗
Konrad Podczeck† Daniela Puzzello‡
Version: September 2010
Abstract
Random matching models with a continuum population are widely used in
economics to study environments where agents interact in small coalitions.
This paper provides foundations to such models. In particular, the paper
establishes an existence result for random matchings that are universal in
the sense that certain desirable properties are satisfied for any assignment
of types to agents. The result applies to infinitely many types of agents,
thus covering random matching models which are currently used in the lit-
erature without a foundation. Furthermore, the paper provides conditions
guaranteeing uniqueness of random matching.
JEL classification: C00, C02, C73, C78
Keywords: Random matching; Involution; Independence; Continuum popu-
lation; Fubini extension
∗We thank an anonymous referee for valuable comments and for suggestions on how to
improve the presentation of the material of this paper.
†Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Wien, Hohenstaufengasse 9, A-1010
Wien, Austria. E-mail: konrad.podczeck@univie.ac.at
‡Department of Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801, USA. E-mail:
dpuzzell@illinois.edu
1
1 Introduction
A substantial part of economics investigates the implications of a variety of
frictions for allocations. An important case are frictions arising because social
interactions occur in a decentralized fashion, i.e., in small groups of agents. Fre-
quently, such contexts are modeled by assuming that there is random matching
of agents. For instance, in several papers in monetary theory, markets with de-
centralized trade are modeled by assuming that agents are randomly matched
in pairs; see, e.g., Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) or Lagos and Wright (2005). In
labor economics, search frictions are modeled by assuming that workers and
firms are randomly matched; see, e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). In game
theory, pairwise random matching of agents is used as a framework to study
environments with infrequent interaction; see, e.g., the papers on social norms
by Kandori (1992), Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995), or Takahashi (2010).
Many models with random matching consider a continuum population, or,
more precisely, a non-atomic probability space of agents. This specification of
the population is taken as a justification for assuming that the random match-
ing satisfies certain desirable properties which, in particular, should ensure that
cross-sectional aggregate outcomes associated with the random matching are
deterministic almost surely. Formal statements of desirable properties of ran-
dom matching will be given in Section 2. Here we illustrate proportionality and
mixing properties with a simple example.
Consider a continuum of agents who are randomly and bilaterally matched.
Suppose that an agent is either a buyer or a seller. Proportionality means that
for any agent the probability of being matched with a buyer (seller) is equal to
the proportion of buyers (sellers) in the population. Mixing, on the other hand,
is a property concerning sample functions and means that, almost surely, the
proportion in the population of those agents of type t that are matched with
agents of type t′ is equal to the product of the proportions of agents of these
types, where both t and t′ can stand for “buyer” or “seller.” Now a typical ap-
proach in random matching models with a continuum population amounts to
taking it for granted that proportionality and some independence in the match-
ing process are satisfied, and that, as a consequence, mixing should be satisfied
as well. The prediction in the example is then that the proportions of matches
between two buyers, two sellers, and a buyer and a seller are, respectively, p21 ,
p22 , and 2p1p2 almost surely, denoting by p1 the proportion of buyers, and by
p2 that of sellers.
This approach has some intuitive appeal. In fact, as noted for instance in
Molzon and Puzzello (2010), proportionality and mixing properties as in the
above example hold asymptotically for uniform random matching on finite pop-
ulations when the number of agents becomes large. That is, these properties are
consistent with the idea of a continuum population as a convenient idealization
of large finite populations. Nevertheless, the approach above is problematic. In-
deed, it is a well known (and rather trivial) fact that if one considers, as in the
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example, a continuum of random variables, indexed by an atomless probabil-
ity space, then just assuming the random variables to be identically distributed
and to satisfy independence conditions does not imply that, almost surely, the
sample functions over the index probability space have a distribution equal to
that of the random variables; actually, it need not even be the case that, almost
surely, distributions of the sample functions are defined.
Taking up such issues, several papers have raised the question of existence
of random matching, and have shown that it is indeed possible to have models
with random matching such that some desired properties are satisfied. We refer
to Aliprantis et al. (2006), Alós-Ferrer (1999), Alós-Ferrer (2002), Boylan (1992),
Boylan (1995), Duffie and Sun (2007), Gilboa and Matsui (1992), and Molzon and
Puzzello (2010).
Alós-Ferrer (1999) is the seminal paper about existence of random match-
ing with a continuum population. In the present paper we continue the line of
research initiated by Alós-Ferrer (1999). In particular, we provide an existence
result which improves on that of Alós-Ferrer (1999) in several aspects. First, we
establish existence of random matchings that are universal in the sense that
certain desirable properties (see Section 2) are satisfied for any assignment of
types to agents. Second, the random matching in our result satisfies indepen-
dence properties which are natural if the population is modeled as a continuum.
Third, our result applies to random matching models with infinitely many types
of agents.
These improvements on the result of Alós-Ferrer (1999) are relevant to eco-
nomic models with random matching. For instance, if a model with repeated
random matching is to be constructed in a context dealing with the evolution of
the frequencies of agents’ types in a population, it is inconvenient to have the
random matching depend on the type assignment. Moreover, for a wide class
of random matching models with a continuum population, it is not possible
to capture the relevant attributes of all the agents in a finite type space. This
is the case, e.g., for the models described in Cavalcanti and Puzzello (2010),
Green and Zhou (2002), Lagos and Wright (2005), Molico (2006), Shi (1997), Zhu
(2005), where there are no upper bounds on money holdings or money holdings
are perfectly divisible, or those described in Hofbauer et al. (2008), Oechssler
and Riedel (2002), Sandholm (2001), van Veelen and Spreij (2009), where infinite
strategy sets matter.
However, it is fair to mention here that, unlike Alós-Ferrer (1999), we do not
take the probability space of agents to be the unit interval [0,1] with Lebesgue
measure. In fact, as shown in Alós-Ferrer (1999), with this choice of the space
of agents there can be no random matching that is universal in the sense above.
Existence of a probability space of agents that does not entail this restriction
is part of our result on existence of random matching. In this sense, our result
provides an alternative to that of Alós-Ferrer (1999), but is not an extension in
the strictly formal sense.
Actually, in our result we can still have [0,1] for the set of agents. It is
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just that the measure involved cannot be Lebesgue measure. However, in many
contexts, a continuum population is assumed just to render individual agents
negligible, that is, only non-atomicity of the measure on the population is im-
portant. In particular, then, if the set of agents is taken to be [0,1], any atomless
probability measure on this set is as good as Lebesgue measure.
An existence result for random matching related to ours can be found in
Duffie and Sun (2007). However, the approach in that paper restricts attention to
random matching with finitely many types of agents. Further, the independence
property required of the random matching in our existence result is stronger
and more natural than that stated in the result of Duffie and Sun (2007). On
the technical side, the approach of Duffie and Sun (2007) relies on nonstandard
analysis, whereas ours stays in the framework of ordinary measure and set the-
ory.
The literature on foundations of random matching so far has mainly focused
on existence problems. Another interesting question concerns uniqueness of
random matching. In fact, as shown in Molzon and Puzzello (2010), a random
matching is not uniquely determined by measure preservation, proportionality,
and mixing properties. However, in this paper we show that, in terms of distri-
butions on the set of matchings, a random matching is uniquely determined by
proportionality and independence properties.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give basic definitions
and present formal statements of measure preserving, proportionality, indepen-
dence, and mixing properties of random matching. Section 3 addresses measur-
ability issues arising with random matching. The main result of our paper is
about existence of independent random matching and is stated and discussed
in Section 4. Section 5 provides a uniqueness result. Most of the proofs are in
Section 6. Note that our existence result is quite general and applies also to
models with infinitely many types. Such models arise naturally in economics, as
illustrated in Section 7 where some examples from the literature are discussed.
2 Properties of Random Matching
We start by introducing some basic definitions, and then state properties of
random matching which are used in a variety of models.
Definition 1. Let X be a set. An involution on X is a bijection f : X → X which
is self-inverse (i.e., such that the inverse f−1 satisfies f−1 = f ); equivalently, an
involution on X is a mapping f : X → X such that f ◦ f is the identity on X.
A mapping f : X → X is said to be fixed point free if f(x) ≠ x for all x ∈ X.
Involutions provide a natural formalization for the notion of bilateral match-
ing (e.g., Alós-Ferrer (1999), Aliprantis et al. (2006)). In this study, we focus on
bilateral matchings where no agent remains unmatched. For short, we will call a
bilateral matching simply a matching.
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Definition 2. A matching on a set A of agents is a fixed point free involution
on A.
We will now give the definition of random matching.
Definition 3. Let (A,A, µ) be a probability space of agents and let (Ω,Σ, ν) be a
sample probability space. A random matching is a mapping f : A×Ω → A such
that
(a) f(·, y) is a matching on A for each y ∈ Ω,
(b) the mappings f(·, y) : A → A and f(x, ·) : Ω → A are measurable for each
y ∈ Ω and each x ∈ A.
Notation. In the context of Definition 3, we also write fx for the function f(x, ·),
and fy for f(·, y).
Definition 3 is general in the sense that it imposes only minimal measurabil-
ity conditions needed to formulate our definitions and results. It leaves the door
open to a variety of specific properties of random matching that are considered
in economic models.
An essential part of random matching models is the specification of agents’
types. The notion of type is meant to capture the payoff-relevant characteristics
of agents. For instance, in several models of monetary theory, the type of an
agent is simply given by his money holdings and by whether he is a buyer or
a seller. In evolutionary game theory, types are identified with strategies (e.g.,
Kandori et al. (1993)).
In this paper, we consider abstract notions of type space and type assign-
ment, defined as follows.
Definition 4. A type space is a measurable space (T ,T ). Given a probability
space (A,A, µ) of agents, a type assignment is a measurable mapping θ from
(A,A, µ) to a type space (T ,T ), and the corresponding type distribution is the
distribution of θ, i.e., the probability measure on T given by τ(B) = µ(θ−1(B))
for each B ∈ T .
We are now ready to formally present desirable properties of random match-
ing. In naming them, we follow Alós-Ferrer (1999) if there is an analog in that
paper (which is the case for (P1)–(P3) and (P5)–(P7) below). See (b)–(d) of Remark 4
at the end of this section for differences between the formalizations given here
and that in Alós-Ferrer (1999).
Let (A,A, µ) be a probability space of agents, (Ω,Σ, ν) a sample probability
space, f : A ×Ω → A a random matching, (T ,T ) a type space, θ : A → T a type
assignment, and τ the corresponding type distribution.
(P1) “Measure preservation:” For all y ∈ Ω, fy is inverse-measure-preserving,
i.e., µ(f−1y (E)) = µ(E) for any E ∈A.
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(P2) “General proportional law:” For all x ∈ A, fx is inverse-measure-preserving,
i.e., ν(f−1x (E)) = µ(E) for any E ∈A.
(P3) “Strong mixing:” For any E1, E2 ∈ A, µ(E1 ∩ f−1y (E2)) = µ(E1)µ(E2) for
almost all y ∈ Ω.
(P4) “General independence:” The family 〈fx〉x∈A is stochastically independent;
that is, the family 〈Σx〉x∈A is stochastically independent, writing Σx for the
sub-σ -algebra of Σ generated by fx .
(P5) “Atomless:” For any two x, x′ ∈ A, the set {y ∈ Ω : fx(y) = x′} is a ν-null
set.
(P6) “Types proportional law:” For all x ∈ A, the mapping θ ◦ fx from Ω to T
has distribution τ , i.e., ν
(
(θ ◦ fx)−1(B)
) = τ(B) for any B ∈ T .
(P7) “Types mixing:” For any B1, B2∈T , µ
(
θ−1(B1)∩(θ◦fy)−1(B2)
)= τ(B1)τ(B2)
for almost all y ∈ Ω.
(P8) “Independence in types:” The family 〈θ ◦ fx〉x∈A of mapping from Ω to T
is stochastically independent; that is, the family 〈Σθx〉x∈A is stochastically
independent, writing Σθx for the sub-σ -algebra of Σ generated by θ ◦ fx .
Property (P1) states that, for all matchings, a given measurable set of agents
must have the same measure as the set of their partners. This is simply a con-
sistency requirement: It should not be the case that, say, 1/8 of the agents are
matched with 5/8 of the agents. Note that if the population is finite, (P1) is au-
tomatically satisfied for the normalized counting measure. The other properties
should be considered in view of continuum populations. Property (P2) says that
for any agent the probability of being paired to an agent belonging to a measur-
able set E in the population A is equal to the proportion of the agents from E
in the total population. This property is usually seen as saying that the random
matching is uniform over the agents. In applications, it plays an important role
for expected payoff equations. Property (P3) states that the measure of the set
of those agents in a given measurable set E1 ⊂ A that are matched with agents
belonging to a measurable set E2 ⊂ A is equal to the product of the measures
of E1 and E2 for almost all matchings. In other words, it states that given any
non-negligible measurable set E1 ⊂ A, the proportion in E1 of the agents that
are matched with agents belonging to another given measurable set E2 ⊂ A is
equal to the proportion of the agents from E2 in the total population, almost
surely in Ω. This property is sometimes interpreted as manifestation of a law of
large numbers. In the next section we show that under some condition this view
can be justified. The intuition behind property (P4) is that, for finitely many
distinct agents in a continuum population, the events that these agents have
partners in any given measurable sets should be independent, as finite sets in a
continuum population (specified as atomless probability space) are negligible.1
1The fact that matching agent xi with agent xj implies xj is matched with xi does not mean
a contradiction to (P4) if the space of agents is atomless and the random matching satisfies (P2),
because any two null sets in the sample space are trivially stochastically independent.
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Of course, (P4) cannot be satisfied if the population is finite. However, consider-
ing uniform random matching on finite populations and letting the number of
agents go to infinity, it may be seen by calculations that, for any fixed integer
k ≥ 2, the deviation from independence that appears for any sets of k agents
vanishes asymptotically.2 Thus, in a model with a continuum population, viewed
as idealization of a large finite set of negligible agents, (P4) may be seen as a nat-
ural property of random matching. Property (P5) states that the probability that
any two given agents are matched is zero. This property may also be seen as
natural in a random matching model with a continuum population. Moreover,
this property is important as it captures the notion of “anonymity” (see Alipran-
tis et al. (2006)). Properties (P6), (P7), and (P8) have meanings similar to those
of (P2), (P3), and (P4) respectively. For instance, (P6) says that for any agent the
probability of being paired to an agent whose type belongs to a measurable set
B in the type space is equal to the proportion of the agents whose types belong
to B.
We note the following simple fact for later reference.
Remark 1. For any type assignment, (P2) implies (P6), (P3) implies (P7), and (P4)
implies (P8). If (A,A, µ) is atomless, then (P2) also implies (P5).3
The proposition below summarizes converse implications. It shows, in par-
ticular, that for a random matching to be universal in the sense that (P6)–(P8)
are satisfied for every possible type assignment, it is necessary that the gen-
eral properties (P2)–(P4) be satisfied. Actually, the matter reduces to finite type
spaces.
Proposition 1. Let (A,A, µ) be a probability space of agents, (Ω,Σ, ν) a sample
probability space, and f : A×Ω → A a random matching.
(a) If f satisfies (P8) for every type assignment with a finite type space, then f
satisfies (P4).
(b) If f satisfies (P7) for every type assignment with a finite type space, then f
satisfies (P3).
(c) If f satisfies (P6) for every type assignment with a finite type space, then f
satisfies (P2).
2Indeed, to capture also finite populations with an odd number of agents, modify Definition 1
to require that at most one agent remains unmatched. Then for each integer n > 0, let An be a
finite population with n agents, and In the set of all matchings on An. Let Pn be the normalized
counting measure on In. Suppose that the random matching is uniform for each n, i.e., that all
elements of In are equally likely. Then, for each n, randomness of matching is described by Pn.
Fix an integer k > 0. For each n > k, let An1 , . . . , A
n
k be any subsets of An, let x
n
1 , . . . , x
n
k be any
distinct agents in An, and for each i = 1, . . . , k, let Fni be the set of those elements of In which
match agent xni with an agent belonging to A
n
i . A straightforward but a bit messy calculation
shows that
∣∣∣Pn(⋂ki=1 Fni )−∏ki=1 Pn(Fni )∣∣∣ → 0 as n → ∞, i.e., the deviation from independence
that appears for any sets of k agents vanishes asymptotically.
3To see that (P4) implies (P8), simply note that, for any x ∈ A, measurability of θ implies
that the σ -algebra generated by θ ◦ fx is included in that generated by fx .
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The proof is elementary. The argument is given in Section 6.3 for complete-
ness.
We close this section with three remarks. The first two concern the positions
of the quantifiers in (P3) and (P7), the third concerns the relationship between
our setting of random matching and that in Alós-Ferrer (1999).
Remark 2. Interchanging the positions of the quantifiers in (P7), one obtains the
following substantially stronger property.
(P7’) For almost all y ∈ Ω, µ(θ−1(B1) ∩ (θ ◦ fy)−1(B2))= τ(B1)τ(B2) for any
two B1, B2 ∈ T .
However, if the σ -algebra of the type space (T ,T ) is countably generated, then
(P7) and (P7’) are equivalent. Indeed, it follows by a straightforward monotone
class argument that if T is countably generated then (P7) implies (P7’); see Sec-
tion 6.4 for details. Actually, in most applications the σ -algebra of the type
space is countably generated. In fact, this property is satisfied whenever the
type space is a Polish space with its Borel σ -algebra, and in particular, of course,
whenever the type space is finite.
Remark 3. In view of the previous remark, it might be tempting to also take the
following strengthening of (P3) into consideration.
(P3’) For almost all y ∈ Ω, µ(E1∩f−1y (E2)) = µ(E1)µ(E2) for any two E1, E2 ∈A.
However, it is trivial that this is false for any random matching f on any prob-
ability space (A,A, µ) of agents which is non-trivial in the sense that µ does
not take only the values 0 and 1 (regardless of whether or not any other of the
properties listed so far are satisfied). Indeed, given any y ∈ Ω, take E2 to be a
member ofA with 0 < µ(E2) < 1, and then take E1 = f−1y (E2) if µ(f−1y (E2)) > 0
and E1 = A otherwise, obtaining a pair of members of A for which the equality
in (P3’) does not hold. (In fact, there is no non-trivial probability space on which
there is a measurable mapping to itself satisfying the equality in (P3’) for all
pairs of measurable subsets.)
Remark 4. As noted in the introduction, research on issues of existence of ran-
dom matching with a continuum population was initiated by Alós-Ferrer (1999),
so some discussion of the relationship between his approach and what has
been presented in this section of our paper is perhaps in order. (Concerning
the choice of the space of agents, see Section 4.)
(a) One minor difference between the approach in our paper and that in Alós-
Ferrer (1999) concerns the general definition of random matching. While in our
paper a random matching is defined as a mapping whose domain is the product
of the agent space with an abstract sample space, in Alós-Ferrer (1999) a random
matching is defined as a probability measure on the set of matchings, actually
on the set of those matchings which are measurable. However, given a random
matching according to this latter approach, one may view the set of measurable
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matchings together with the measure on top of it as the sample space and then
has a random matching according to our definition, the mapping f of our defini-
tion now being concretely given by f(x,y) = y(x), y a measurable matching,
x a point in the agent space, the only qualification being that it need not be
true that the mappings f(x, ·) are measurable as required in our definition. In
Alós-Ferrer (1999), a measurability property is imposed on these mappings im-
plicitly in the proportionality properties stated for a random matching, but not
as part of the general definition of random matching. Actually, we could also
have formulated our setting in such a way that measurability of the functions
f(x, ·) is not part of the definition of random matching, but we have found it
convenient to have measurability of these functions out in the open prior to
the statement of the specific properties of a random matching, in particular in
view of the independence properties we consider in our paper. Apart from this
aspect, a random matching according to the definition in Alós-Ferrer (1999) can
be viewed as random matching according to our definition. Thus, in principle,
our definition of random matching encompasses that of Alós-Ferrer (1999). For
reasons of notational flexibility, we have chosen to work with an abstract sample
space in our paper.
(b) Regarding the specific properties of random matching, we first note that
in Alós-Ferrer (1999) the properties “types proportional law” and “types mixing”
are stated in terms of singleton subsets of the type space. That is, translated
into our setting and notation, only singletons are taken for the sets B, B1, and
B2 in the statements of properties (P6) and (P7) respectively. Of course, this is
equivalent to the way these properties are actually stated in our paper if, as
in Alós-Ferrer (1999), the type space is finite (and its σ -algebra contains the
singleton subsets).
(c) Concerning the properties “measure preservation” and “strong mixing,” in
our paper their statements involve inverse images of measurable subsets of the
agent space, while in Alós-Ferrer (1999) they are formulated in terms of direct
images. That is, to use our notation, what is f−1y (E) in our statements of (P1) and
(P3) is fy(E) in the corresponding statements in Alós-Ferrer (1999). However, by
the very definition of random matching, the functions fy are involutions, i.e.,
f−1y (E) and fy(E) are the same, so it is just a matter of taste and habit which
form one prefers to work with.
(d) Actually, the way in which in Alós-Ferrer (1999) the quantifiers in the
statement of the “strong mixing” property are placed leaves it unclear whether
in Alós-Ferrer (1999) this property is meant in the sense of (P3) or in that of (P3’)
as formulated in Remark 3. However, as noted in that remark, it is trivial that
(P3’) fails for any random matching with a non-trivial space of agents.
(e) Our statements of the properties “general proportional law” and “atom-
less” are as in Alós-Ferrer (1999) apart from notation. Independence properties,
as for instance (P4) and (P8) of our paper, are not considered in Alós-Ferrer
(1999).
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3 Joint measurability issues
Let (A,A, µ) be a probability space of agents, (Ω,Σ, ν) a sample probability
space, f : A × Ω → A a random matching, (T ,T ) a type space, and θ : A → T a
type assignment. Further, let λ denote the product measure on A × Ω defined
from µ and ν , and Λ its domain.
Joint measurability issues with random matching arise in contexts like the
following. Suppose that r : T × T → R is a bounded T ⊗ T -measurable func-
tion with the interpretation that if an agent of type t is matched with an agent
of type t′ then the former agent gets a reward r(t, t′). Let R : A × Ω → R
denote the corresponding reward process, i.e., the process defined by setting
R(x,y) = r(θ(x), θ(f(x,y))) for x ∈ A and y ∈ Ω. In such a situation, it is
natural that one would like to talk about an expected aggregate reward. More-
over, one would like to be able to express the expected aggregate reward in
terms of repeated integrals with respect to the factor measures µ and ν ; in
particular, one might want to relate it to cross-sectional aggregate rewards. For
these purposes, it would be ideal if the random matching f were jointly mea-
surable, i.e., (Λ,A)-measurable.4 If this is the case, then for any given θ and r
as above, the process R is Λ-measurable, so that the expected aggregate reward
is defined as the integral of R with respect to λ and can be computed in terms
of repeated integrals according to Fubini’s theorem.
Unfortunately, joint measurability may conflict with other desirable proper-
ties of random matching. Since the concern of this paper is random matching
on continuum populations, we will just give a short argument showing that if
the probability space (A,A, µ) of agents is atomless, then it is impossible for
the random matching f to be (Λ,A)-measurable if (P2) and (P4) are satisfied.
To see this, suppose the contrary. Then since (A,A, µ) is atomless, we can
select a measurable function θ : A → {0,1} with distribution (1/2,1/2). Let g
be the composition g = θ ◦ f . Then g is Λ-measurable, and (P2) and (P4) imply
that for the family
〈
gx
〉
x∈A of sections of g we have
∫
Ω|gx − gx′| dν = 1/2
for any two distinct x, x′ ∈ A. Now by a standard fact,5 since g is bounded
and Λ-measurable, there is a null set N ⊂ A such that the set {g•x : x ∈ A\N}
is a separable subset of L1(ν), writing g•x for the ν-equivalence class of gx ,
x ∈ A. However, this contradicts the above conclusion about the family 〈gx〉x∈A
because, (A,A, µ) being atomless, A\N is uncountable.
Fortunately it will turn out that joint measurability as a condition on ran-
dom matching can be relaxed into a condition that practically does the same
job as joint measurability, but is not inconsistent with a combination of (P2)
and (P4) (and the other general properties). The suitable concept in this regard
is provided by the notion of a Fubini extension of a product measure, a notion
4As usual, if Σ and T are σ -algebras on sets X and Y respectively, “(Σ,T)-measurable” for a
function f : X → Y means f−1(E) ∈ Σ for each E ∈ T; in case Y = R, “Σ-measurable” means
f−1(E) ∈ Σ for each Borel set E ⊂ R.
5See, e.g., Fremlin (2003, 418S) and Fremlin (2001, 245X(h)).
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introduced by Sun (2006) into the economics literature. Here is a formal defini-
tion.
Definition 5. Let (X,Σ, µ) and (Y ,T, ν) be probability spaces, and (X × Y ,Λ, λ)
the corresponding product probability space. Let λ¯ be a probability measure
on X × Y , and Λ¯ its domain. Then λ¯ is said to be a Fubini extension of λ if
(a) Λ¯ ⊃ Λ and (b) for each H ∈ Λ¯—denoting by χH the characteristic function
of H—the integrals
∫ ∫
χH(x,y)dν(y)dµ(x) and
∫ ∫
χH(x,y)dµ(x)dν(y) are
well-defined and
∫ ∫
χH(x,y)dν(y)dµ(x) = λ¯(H) = ∫ ∫ χH(x,y)dµ(x)dν(y).
Note that (a) and (b) in this definition imply that λ¯ agrees with λ on Λ, so λ¯ is
indeed an extension of λ. The definition implies in particular that the conclusion
of Fubini’s theorem about repeated integrals with respect to the factor measures
µ and ν continues to hold for λ¯-integrable real-valued functions.
Now in the context above, suppose there is a Fubini extension λ¯ of λ such
that the random matching f is (Λ¯,A)-measurable, writing Λ¯ for the domain
of λ¯. Then, for any θ : A → T and r : T × T → R as above, the reward process R
is Λ¯-measurable, and thus the expected aggregate reward can be defined as the
integral of R against λ¯. This still gives a meaningful notion of expected aggre-
gate reward, because, by the definition of Fubini extension, λ¯ preserves its ties
with λ in such a way that this integral can be expressed in terms of repeated
integrals against the factor measures µ and ν . In particular, the expected aggre-
gate reward, so defined, does not depend on the particular choice of the Fubini
extension λ¯, subject to the requirement that f be (Λ¯,A)-measurable.6
Part of our existence result for random matching (to be stated in the next
section) is that this kind of generalized joint measurability property can indeed
be satisfied simultaneously with all the properties of random matching listed
in Section 2. Here we note that if the probability space of agents is atomless
and the random matching satisfies all of (P2), (P3), and (P4) then, in fact, an
appropriate Fubini extension of the product of the measures on the agent space
and the sample space must exist.
Proposition 2. Let (A,A, µ) be an atomless probability space of agents, (Ω,Σ, ν)
a sample probability space, and f : A×Ω → A a random matching. Let λ be the
product probability measure on A×Ω defined from µ and ν . If f satisfies (P2) to
(P4), then λ has a Fubini extension λ¯ such that f is (Λ¯,A)-measurable, writing Λ¯
for the domain of λ¯.
See Section 6.2 for the proof.
In the previous section we mentioned that property (P3) is sometimes viewed
as manifestation of a law of large numbers. Now the notion of Fubini extension
also provides the framework in which this view may be justified, in the sense
that (P3) may be derived as a conclusion from (P2) and (P4) (note that given any
6For a recent application of the notion of Fubini extension outside the scope of random
matching models, see Sun and Yannelis (2008). A general result on existence of (proper) Fubini
extensions can be found in Podczeck (2010).
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random matching f : A×Ω → A, these latter two properties together mean that
the family 〈fx〉x∈A is i.i.d.). In fact, the following holds.
Proposition 3. Let (A,A, µ) be an atomless probability space of agents, (Ω,Σ, ν)
a sample probability space, and f : A×Ω → A a random matching. Let λ be the
product probability measure on A×Ω defined from µ and ν . Suppose:
(i) There is a Fubini extension λ¯ of λ such that f is (Λ¯,A)-measurable, writing
Λ¯ for the domain of λ¯.
(ii) f satisfies (P2) and (P4).
Then f satisfies (P3).7
Note that Propositions 2 and 3 in combination say that if a random matching
on a continuum population satisfies (P2) and (P4), then (P3) and (i) of Proposi-
tion 3 are equivalent properties. Thus, for a “large numbers” interpretation of
the strong mixing property to be valid, it is both necessary and sufficient that
the random matching have the measurability property stated in (i) of Proposi-
tion 3.
As the proof of Proposition 3 is short and illustrative for the role of a Fubini
extension, it will be given here.
Proof of Proposition 3. Fix any E1, E2 ∈ A and pick any B ∈ Σ. Note first that
by (i), we have (E1×B)∩f−1(E2) ∈ Λ¯, and therefore, from the definition of Fubini
extension, the integrals
∫
E1 ν
(
B ∩ f−1x (E2)
)
dµ(x) and
∫
B µ
(
E1 ∩ f−1y (E2)
)
dν(y)
are well-defined and equal. Write ΣB for the sub-σ -algebra of Σ generated by B,
and Σx for that generated by fx , x ∈ A. Now (P4) says that the family 〈Σx〉x∈A
is stochastically independent. Using Fremlin (2008, 5A6-272W), it follows that
there is a countable D ⊂ A such that for each x ∈ A\D , ΣB and Σx are stochasti-
cally independent. As (A,A, ν) is atomless, this means ΣB and Σx are stochasti-
cally independent for almost all x ∈ A. Thus ν(B ∩ f−1x (E2)) = ν(B)ν(f−1x (E2))
for almost all x ∈ A. Finally, note that from (P2) we have ν(f−1x (E2)) = µ(E2)
for all x ∈ A.
Putting all these together, we may conclude that, for any B ∈ Σ,∫
B
µ
(
E1 ∩ f−1y (E2)
)
dν(y) =
∫
E1
ν
(
B ∩ f−1x (E2)
)
dµ(x)
=
∫
E1
ν(B)ν(f−1x (E2))dµ
(
x)
=
∫
E1
ν(B)µ(E2)dµ(x)
= ν(B)µ(E2)µ(E1).
By the Radon-Nikodym theorem it follows that µ
(
E1 ∩ f−1y (E2)
) = µ(E1)µ(E2)
for almost all y ∈ Σ. Thus, as E1, E2 ∈A are arbitrary, f satisfies (P3).
7A warning may be in order here. Conditions (i) and (ii) cannot be satisfied simultaneously
when (A,A, µ) is taken to be [0,1] with Lebesgue measure. Indeed, with this choice of the space
of agents, there can be no random matching satisfying (P3); see Section 4 for this.
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As noted in Remark 1, if a random matching satisfies (P3) then it satisfies (P7)
for every type assignment. Thus we have the following corollary of Theorem 3.
Corollary 1. Let (A,A, µ) be an atomless probability space of agents, (Ω,Σ, ν)
a sample probability space, and f : A×Ω → A a random matching. Let λ be the
product probability measure on A×Ω defined from µ and ν . Suppose:
(i) There is a Fubini extension λ¯ of λ such that f is (Λ¯,A)-measurable, writing
Λ¯ for the domain of λ¯.
(ii) f satisfies (P2) and (P4).
Then f satisfies (P7) for every type assignment.
Remark 5. We note here that even when a random matching is jointly mea-
surable (or satisfies (i) of Proposition 3), mixing properties do not follow from
proportionality properties if no independence properties are satisfied. This is
illustrated in the following example where (P6) holds but (P7) does not.
Example 1. Take the probability space (A,A, µ) of agents to be ([0,1] ,B, λ),
where λ is Lebesgue measure, and B the Borel σ−algebra of [0,1]. Partition
[0,1] into eight measurable subsets A1, . . . , A8, each with measure 1/8. Let(
Ai, Aj
)
denote “the agents in Ai are matched with the agents in Aj .” Recall that
given any C,C′ ∈ B of the same measure, there is an inverse measure preserv-
ing bijection from C onto C′. Using this fact, we can construct four matchings
f1, . . . , f4 on [0,1] such that each fi is inverse measure-preserving and such
that
f1 satisfies (A1, A2) (A3, A7) (A4, A8) (A5, A6)
f2 satisfies (A1, A5) (A2, A6) (A3, A4) (A7, A8)
f3 satisfies (A1, A2) (A3, A4) (A5, A6) (A7, A8)
f4 satisfies (A1, A6) (A2, A5) (A3, A8) (A4, A7)
Let the sample probability space (Ω,Σ, ν) be the set {1,2,3,4} with normal-
ized counting measure and let a random matching f : [0,1] × Ω → [0,1] be
given by f(x, i) = fi(x) for x ∈ [0,1] and i ∈ Ω. Assume that there are just
two types 0 and 1, and that the type assignment θ : [0,1] → {0,1} is given by
θ(x) = 0 for x ∈ ⋃4j=1Aj , and θ(x) = 1 for x ∈ ⋃8j=5Aj . Then, since in state 3
there is no match between any agents of different types, f fails to satisfy (P7).
On the other hand, since each of the four matchings is equally likely, it is easy
to check that f satisfies (P6). Moreover, f is B⊗Σ−measurable. However, since
there are only finitely many sub-σ -algebras of Σ, f cannot satisfy independence
conditions as in (P4) or (P8).
4 The main existence result
In this section we state our main theorem on existence of random matching. It
is important to note that in this theorem the space of agents cannot be [0,1]
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with Lebesgue measure (see Remark 8 for more on this). As already remarked
in the introduction, by not taking the space of agents to be [0,1] with Lebesgue
measure, we depart from the approach in Alós-Ferrer (1999). The following no-
tation applies in the sequel. For any set X, #(X) denotes its cardinal; c denotes
the cardinal of the continuum.
Theorem 1. There exists an atomless probability space (A,A, µ) of agents, a sam-
ple probability space (Ω,Σ, ν), and a random matching f : A ×Ω → A such that
the following hold.
(a) f satisfies (P1) to (P5).
(b) Given any type space (T ,T ) and type assignment θ : A → T , f satisfies (P6)
to (P8).
(c) Let λ be the product measure on A × Ω defined from µ and ν . There is a
Fubini extension λ¯ of λ such that f is (Λ¯,A)-measurable, writing Λ¯ for the
domain of λ¯; in particular, given any type space (T ,T ) and type assignment
θ : A→ T , the type process θ ◦ f is (Λ¯,T )-measurable.
(d) The probability space (A,A, µ) of agents can be constructed with #(A) = c.
The proof is in Section 6.1. The following remarks comment on the theorem.
Remark 6. The theorem will be proved by showing that there is a random match-
ing on an atomless probability space (A,A, µ) of agents with #(A) = c such that
(P1) to (P4) are satisfied. By Remark 1 and Proposition 2, this establishes the
entire theorem.
Remark 7. Note that Theorem 1 gives a random matching which is independent
of type spaces and type assignments. In particular, it gives a random matching
such that the important types mixing property is satisfied for every possible
type assignment.
Moreover, our result applies to the case of infinitely many types. Indeed,
recall that given any atomless probability space (A,A, µ) and any Borel prob-
ability measure γ on a Polish space Z , there is a mapping θ : A → Z which is
inverse-measure-preserving for µ and γ; in other words, every such γ is the dis-
tribution of some measurable mapping from A to Z . Consequently, Theorem 1
allows for any Borel probability measure on a Polish space to be taken as type
distribution.
In both of these aspects, our existence result for random matching improves
on that in Alós-Ferrer (1999). Another difference from Alós-Ferrer (1999) is that,
in our result, the random matching satisfies general independence. As pointed
out in Section 2, in a random matching model with a continuum population it
may be natural to require this property.
In regard to independence properties, Theorem 1 also differs from the exis-
tence result for random matching in Duffie and Sun (2007, Theorem 2.4) where
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only pairwise independence in types is required, i.e., property (P8) of our paper,
weakened to pairwise independence.8 However, given that one wants random
matchings to satisfy independence properties, it seems more natural to require
independence directly for the matching process, as with property (P4), and to
require stochastic independence in the usual sense, rather than only pairwise
independence.
Furthermore, unlike Duffie and Sun (2007), our result is not based on non-
standard analysis. In particular, it does not depend on Loeb space construc-
tions.9
Remark 8. Theorem 1(d) says that the probability space (A,A, µ) of agents can
be constructed so that A may be identified as a set with the unit interval [0,1]
via a bijection; that is, if one likes, one can take A = [0,1] in Theorem 1. The
point is that the measure µ cannot be Lebesgue measure on [0,1]. In fact, as
noted in Alós-Ferrer (1999, Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.2), if the space of
agents is taken to be [0,1] with Lebesgue measure, then a random matching
satisfying (P1) must fail (P3) and in particular cannot satisfy (P7) for every pos-
sible type assignment.
We note here that one does not need to invoke (P1) to reach this negative
conclusion. In Remark 9 below we show that, in fact, (P3) alone cannot be sat-
isfied by any random matching when the space of agents is taken to be [0,1]
with Lebesgue measure. By Proposition 1, this in turn implies that, with this
choice of the space of agents, no random matching can satisfy (P7) for every
type assignment.
Similarly, by Proposition 3, if one would like to have a random matching
that satisfies independence and proportionality properties, as well as some joint
measurability property with respect to agents and sample points, then [0,1]
with Lebesgue measure is also not the appropriate choice of the probability
space of agents.
Of course, there are economic contexts where it has a specific meaning that
the space of agents is taken to be [0,1] with Lebesgue measure, e.g., contexts
where geographical location of agents matters. In such contexts our result does
not apply.
Frequently, however, as for instance in standard general equilibrium mod-
els, it is of no economic significance whether or not the space of agents is [0,1]
with Lebesgue measure. Indeed, if a large set of negligible agents is modeled
as an atomless probability space just to establish that any single agent has
strictly no influence on aggregate levels, then, to quote Hildenbrand (1974, p.
8Actually, Duffie and Sun (2007) speak of essential pairwise independence in types, which in
our notation means that for almost all x ∈ A, θ ◦ fx is stochastically independent of θ ◦ fx′ for
almost all x′ ∈ A.
9Built on their 2007 result, Duffie and Sun (2010) recently have constructed a random match-
ing satisfying pairwise independence in types for some type assignments where the space of
agents is [0,1] with an extension of Lebesgue measure. However, in that result, the random
matching is not universal with respect to type assignments. Also, the measure preservation
property fails.
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113), the σ -algebra should be considered as “only been introduced for technical
reasons” and, conceptually, “be considered . . . as the set of all subsets” of the
set of agents.10 Under this view, any atomless probability measure on [0,1] is as
good as any other in modeling a large set of negligible agents, and a particular
choice, e.g. according to our Theorem 1, of a σ -algebra, or probability measure,
on the set of agents should not be discussed in terms of economic meaning, but
should be seen as a technical device having to do some job.
Remark 9. That (P3) cannot be satisfied by any random matching if the space
of agents is [0,1] with Lebesgue measure (regardless of whether or not (P1) is
satisfied) may be seen as follows. Let B be the Borel σ -algebra of [0,1], let µ
be Lebesgue measure on [0,1], and let C ⊂ B be a countable algebra generating
B. Suppose there would be a random matching f : [0,1] ×Ω → [0,1] such that
(P3) is satisfied with respect to µ. Pick any E2 ∈ B with µ(E2) = 1/2. Then (P3)
implies that there is a y¯ ∈ Ω such that µ(E1 ∩ f−1y¯ (E2)) = µ(E1)µ(E2) for all
E1 ∈ C. Note that for any y ∈ Ω,
{
E1 ∈ B : µ(E1 ∩ f−1y (E2)) = µ(E1)µ(E2)
}
is
a monotone class. It follows that µ(E1 ∩ f−1y¯ (E2)) = µ(E1)µ(E2) for all E1 ∈ B.
But this is impossible. To see this, take E1 to be any member of B which differs
from f−1y¯ (E2) by a null set if µ(f−1y¯ (E2)) > 0, and take E1 = [0,1] otherwise.
5 A uniqueness result
In the introduction we mentioned the observation in Molzon and Puzzello (2010)
that a random matching is not uniquely determined by measure preservation,
proportionality, and mixing properties. In this section we will address this issue.
It will turn out that the crucial properties to get uniqueness of random matching
are general proportionality and general independence. Some additional notation
is needed.
Notation. Given a probability space (A,A, µ) of agents, MA ⊂ AA denotes the
set of all matchings on A, i.e., the set of all fixed point free involutions on A;
further, writing γ¯ for the product probability measure on AA defined from µ,
γ denotes the restriction of γ¯ to the σ -algebra generated by the measurable
cylinders in AA, γA the subspace measure onMA induced from γ, and ΓA the do-
main of γA. Given in addition a sample probability space (Ω,Σ, ν) and a random
matching f : A × Ω → A, φ : Ω → MA denotes the mapping defined by setting
φ(y) = fy for y ∈ Ω.
Now, given a probability space (A,A, µ) of agents, the following theorem
shows that if a random matching exists, then, in terms of distributions on
(MA, ΓA), it is unique subject to (P2) and (P4).
10In particular, then, it should not be considered an essential point whether or not the σ -
algebra is countably generated. Further, the σ -algebra need not be derived from any topological
structure on the set of agents, and hence, in case of [0,1] as set of agents, it should also not be
considered an essential point whether or not the sub-intervals of [0,1] belong to the σ -algebra.
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Theorem 2. Let (A,A, µ) be a probability space of agents. Then if (Ω,Σ, ν) is any
sample probability space and f : A×Ω → A is a random matching, the mapping
φ is (Σ, ΓA)-measurable, and if f satisfies (P2) and (P4), the distribution of φ on
(MA, ΓA) is γA.
Proof. It suffices to show that φ, viewed as a mapping from Ω to AA, has the
property that φ−1(Z) ∈ Σ whenever Z is a measurable cylinder in AA, and that
if f satisfies (P2) and (P4) then ν(φ−1(Z)) = γ(Z) for any such Z . Thus let Z
be a measurable cylinder in AA. Then for some finite collection x1, . . . , xn of
distinct members of A, together with members B1, . . . , Bn of A, we have Z =
Ex1B1 ∩ · · · ∩ E
xn
Bn where E
xi
Bi = {z ∈ AA : z(xi) ∈ Bi}, i = 1, . . . , n. Note that for
each i = 1, . . . , n, φ−1(ExiBi ) = f−1xi (Bi), because for any y ∈ Ω,
φ(y) ∈ ExiBi a φ(y)(xi) ∈ Bia fy(xi) ∈ Bia fxi(y) ∈ Bi.
Now by definition of random matching, fx is (Σ,A)-measurable for any x ∈ A.
It follows that φ−1
(
ExiBi
) ∈ Σ for each i = 1, . . . , n, and hence that φ−1(Z) ∈ Σ.
Moreover, if f satisfies (P2) and (P4), then
ν
(
φ−1(Z)
) = ν(φ−1(Ex1B1 )∩ · · · ∩φ−1(ExnBn ))
= ν(f−1x1 (B1)∩ · · · ∩ f−1xn (Bn))
=
n∏
i=1
ν(f−1xi (Bi)) by (P4)
=
n∏
i=1
µ(Bi) by (P2)
= γ(Ex1B1 ∩ · · · ∩ ExnBn ) = γ(Z),
the first equality in the previous line by the definition of product measure since
the elements x1, . . . , xn of A are distinct. This completes the proof.
As noted in Proposition 1, if a random matching satisfies (P6) and (P8) for any
type assignment with a finite type space, then it satisfies (P2) and (P4). Therefore
the above uniqueness result can equivalently be stated in the following way in
terms of type assignments.
Corollary 2. Let (A,A, µ) be a probability space of agents. Then if (Ω,Σ, ν) is
any sample probability space and f : A×Ω → A is a random matching satisfying
(P6) and (P8) for every type assignment with a finite type space, the distribution
of φ on (MA, ΓA) is γA.
6 Remaining proofs
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Let ω1 be the least uncountable ordinal. For each ξ < ω1, choose a subset
Kξ ⊂ ω1 with #(Kξ) = #(ξ) such that η > ξ for each η ∈ Kξ , and then choose a
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bijection ρξ : ξ → Kξ . Define hξ : ω1 →ω1 by setting
hξ(η) =

ρξ(η) for η < ξ
ρ−1ξ (η) for η ∈ Kξ
η for η 6∈ ξ ∪Kξ .
Then for each ξ < ω1, hξ is an involution on ω1.
Consider the product space {0,1}ω1 . Let λ be the usual measure on {0,1}ω1 ,
and let Λ denote the domain of λ. Recall that λ is complete. For each ξ < ω1,
define a mapping φˆξ : {0,1}ω1 → {0,1}ω1 by setting, for each x ∈ {0,1}ω1 ,
φˆξ(x) = x ◦ hξ .
(Thus φˆξ(x) is the element in {0,1}ω1 that is given by φˆξ(x)(η) = x(hξ(η))
for η < ω1.) Then for each ξ < ω1, φˆξ is inverse-measure-preserving for λ,
and since hξ is an involution, φˆξ is an involution, too. (To see that φˆξ is an
involution, observe that for each x ∈ {0,1}ω1 ,
φˆξ(φˆξ(x)) = φˆξ(x ◦ hξ) = (x ◦ hξ) ◦ hξ = x ◦ (hξ ◦ hξ) = x.
To see that φˆξ is inverse-measure-preserving for λ, observe that whenever I is
a finite subset of ω1, we have
λ
({
x ∈ {0,1}ω1 : x(hξ(η)) = 1 for every η ∈ I
}) = 2−#(I),
because hξ is an injection.)
We claim that given any E1, E2 ∈ Λ, for all but countably many ξ < ω1
the sets E1 and φˆ−1ξ (E2) are stochastically independent, i.e., λ(E1 ∩ φˆ−1ξ (E2)) =
λ(E1)λ(φˆ−1ξ (E2)). To see this, pick any E1, E2 ∈ Λ. There is an E′1 ∈ Λ which
differs from E1 by a null set and is determined by coordinates in a countable
subset of ω1, say D1, and there is an E′2 ∈ Λ which differs from E2 by a null set
and is determined by coordinates in a countable subset of ω1, say D2. Then by
choice of φˆξ , for each ξ < ω1 the set φˆ−1ξ (E
′
2) is determined by coordinates in
hξ(D2). Asω1 has uncountable cofinality, we can find a β < ω1 such that η < β
for every η ∈ D1∪D2. Then by choice of hξ , for each ξ < ω1 with ξ > β, we have
η > β for every η ∈ hξ(D2). Hence for each ξ < ω1 with ξ > β, D1∩hξ(D2) = ∅,
which implies that the sets E′1 and φˆ
−1
ξ (E
′
2) are stochastically independent, E
′
1
being determined by coordinates in D1, and φˆ−1ξ (E
′
2) by coordinates in hξ(D2).
Since φˆξ is inverse-measure-preserving for λ, the fact that E′1 and E
′
2 differ by
null sets from E1, E2, respectively, implies that φˆ−1ξ (E
′
2) differs by a null set
from φˆ−1ξ (E2), and E
′
1 ∩ φˆ−1ξ (E′2) by a null set from E1 ∩ φˆ−1ξ (E2). Consequently
E1 and φˆ−1ξ (E2) are stochastically independent for each ξ < ω1 with ξ > β, and
thus the claim above is established.
Because each φˆξ is inverse-measure-preserving for λ, it follows that given
any E1, E2 ∈ Λ we have λ(E1 ∩ φˆ−1ξ (E2)) = λ(E1)λ(E2) for all but countably
many ξ < ω1.
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Let
A = {x ∈ {0,1}ω1 : for some α < ω1, x(ξ) = 1 for all ξ < ω1 with ξ > α}.
Evidently A is expressible as the union ofω1 sets of cardinal c, so #(A) = c. Also,
A has full outer measure for λ, by the fact that every non-negligible member of Λ
includes a non-empty set that is determined by coordinates in some countable
subset of ω1, together with the fact that ω1 has uncountable cofinality.
Let µ be the subspace measure on A induced from λ, and let A denote its
domain. Then, as A has full outer measure for λ, (A,A, µ) is a probability space.
Clearly, as λ is complete and atomless, so is µ.
For each ξ < ω1 let φ˜ξ be the restriction of φˆξ to A. Note that by con-
struction, for each ξ < ω1 and each x ∈ {0,1}ω1 , φˆξ(x) and x agree in all but
countably many coordinates in ω1. Consequently, for each ξ < ω1, whenever
x ∈ A then φ˜ξ(x) ∈ A, again using the fact that ω1 has uncountable cofinality.
Thus since φˆξ is an involution on {0,1}ω1 , φ˜ξ is an involution on A. By the
fact that A has full outer measure for λ, the properties of the functions φˆξ ,
ξ < ω1, also imply that, for each ξ < ω1, φ˜ξ is inverse-measure-preserving
for µ, and that, given any E1, E2 ∈ A, for all but countably many ξ < ω1 we
have µ(E1 ∩ φ˜−1ξ (E2)) = µ(E1)µ(E2).
We will now modify the mappings φ˜ξ so as to make them fixed point free.
Pick any ξ < ω1 with ξ ≥ω. Let
∆ξ =
{
x ∈ {0,1}ω1 : x(η) = x(hξ(η)) for each η < ω1
}
and let ∆Aξ = ∆ξ ∩A. Then by the definitions of φˆξ and φ˜ξ , ∆Aξ is exactly the set
of fixed points of φ˜ξ . Now by the definition of hξ ,
{η < ω1 : η < ξ} ∩ hξ({η < ω1 : η < ξ}) = ∅.
Hence since ξ ≥ω, ∆ξ is a λ-null set in {0,1}ω1 (directly from the definition of λ
to be the usual measure on {0,1}ω1 ), and thus ∆Aξ is a µ-null set in A. Finally,
∆Aξ is an infinite subset of A. (To see this, note that by definition of hξ , for some
countable D ⊂ ω1 we have hξ(η) = η for all η < ω1 with η ∉ D, and let B be
the set of those x in A for which x(η) = 1 for all η < ω1 with the exception of
exactly one η < ω1 with η ∉ D. Then B is an infinite subset of A, and since hξ
is a bijection we must have B ⊂ ∆Aξ .)
Now by the fact that any infinite set can be partitioned into two sets of the
same cardinality, we can choose a fixed point free involution κξ : ∆Aξ → ∆Aξ . As
∆Aξ is the set of fixed points of φ˜ξ , the restriction of φ˜ξ to A\∆Aξ is an involution
on A\∆Aξ . Therefore, defining φξ : A→ A by
φξ(x) =
κξ(x) if x ∈ ∆Aξφ˜ξ(x) if x ∈ A\∆Aξ ,
φξ is a fixed point free involution on A. As φξ agrees with φ˜ξ on the comple-
ment of a µ-null set, φξ is inverse-measure-preserving for µ.
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Doing this construction for all ξ < ω1 with ξ ≥ω, and then letting φξ = φω
for ξ < ω, we get a family 〈φξ〉ξ<ω1 of fixed point free involutions on A, each
of them inverse-measure-preserving for µ. Moreover, given any E1, E2 ∈ A, for
all but countably many ξ < ω1 we have µ(E1 ∩φ−1ξ (E2)) = µ(E1)µ(E2), by the
corresponding property of the family 〈φ˜ξ〉ξ<ω1 , because φξ agrees with φ˜ξ on
the complement of a µ-null set for ω ≤ ξ < ω1.
Now choose a family 〈xξ〉ξ<ω1 of elements of A so that given any countable
D ⊂ A, for some ξ < ω1 we have both xξ ∉ D and φξ(xξ) ∉ D. Such a choice
is possible. Indeed, by transfinite recursion on ω1 choose a family 〈xξ〉ξ<ω1 as
follows. Let x0 be an arbitrary point of A. Given that 〈xη〉η<ξ has been chosen,
where ξ < ω1, consider the set Aξ = {xη,φη(xη) : η < ξ}. Then Aξ is countable,
so, because A is uncountable and φξ is a bijection, we can choose an xξ in
A such that both xξ ∉ Aξ and φξ(xξ) ∉ Aξ . This completes the recursion.
The result is a family 〈xξ〉ξ<ω1 of distinct elements of A such that the family
〈φξ(xξ)〉ξ<ω1 also consists of distinct elements. Thus 〈xξ〉ξ<ω1 is a family as
desired.
Let ν¯ be the complete product probability measure on AA defined from µ,
and let Σ¯ denote the domain of ν¯ . For each ξ < ω1 let
Nξ =
{
y ∈ AA : (a) y is a fixed point free involution on A,
(b) y(xξ) = φξ(xξ),
(c) y uA\N = φξ uA\N for some µ-null set N ⊂ A
}
,
and then let Ω = ⋃ξ<ω1 Nξ .
From (c) in the definition of Nξ , each y ∈ Ω is inverse-measure-preserving
for µ. From (b) in that definition, each Nξ is a ν¯-null set in AA because, µ being
atomless, singletons in A are µ-null sets.
On the other hand, Ω has full outer measure for ν¯ . To see this, note first
that it suffices to show that Ω intersects every non-negligible subset of AA that
is determined by coordinates in some countable subset of A (since every non-
negligible element of Σ¯ includes such a set). Thus let E be a non-negligible subset
of AA, determined by coordinates in a countable subset of A, say D.
As D is countable and (A,A, µ) is atomless, the set of all y in AA such that
y uD is injective is an element of Σ¯ with ν¯-measure 1 (see Fremlin, 2001, 254V).
Also, since a countable subset of A is a µ-null set in A, for each x ∈ A the set of
all y in AA such that y(x) ∈ D is a ν¯-null set in AA, and hence (using again the
fact that D is countable) the set of all y in AA such that D ∩y(D) = ∅ belongs
to Σ¯ and has ν¯-measure 1. Consequently, because E is non-negligible, there is an
element of E, say y0, such that y0 uD is a bijection onto y0(D) and such that
D ∩y0(D) = ∅.
Set D′ = y0(D). Then D ∪ D′ is countable, so we can choose a countably
infinite subset H of A with H ∩ (D ∪ D′) = ∅. Set C = H ∪ D ∪ D′. Then C is
again countable, so by choice of the family 〈xξ〉ξ<ω1 , there is a ξ < ω1 such
that xξ ∉ C as well as φξ(xξ) ∉ C . Fix such a ξ and set C′ = C ∪φξ(C). Using
the fact that φξ is an involution, we may see that xξ ∉ C′.
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Also by the fact that φξ is an involution, we have φξ(C′) = C′ and therefore
φξ(A\C′) = A\φξ(C′) = A\C′. Thus φξ uA\C′ is a fixed point free involution
on A\C′.
Note that by choice of C , the set C′ \(D ∪ D′) is infinite. Hence, since an
infinite set can be partitioned into two sets of the same cardinality, we can
choose a fixed point free involution ζ : C′\(D ∪D′)→ C′\(D ∪D′).
Now as y0 uD is a bijection onto D′, and D ∩ D′ = ∅, we get a fixed point
free involution y1 : A→ A by setting, for x ∈ A,
y1(x) =

y0(x) if x ∈ D
y−10 (x) if x ∈ D′
ζ(x) if x ∈ C′\(D ∪D′)
φξ(x) if x ∈ A\C′.
In particular, then, since xξ ∉ C′, we have y1(xξ) = φξ(xξ). Thus y1 ∈ Ω,
because the countable set C′ is a µ-null set in A. On the other hand, y1 agrees
with y0 on D, and since y0 ∈ E and E is determined by coordinates in D, we
have y1 ∈ E. Thus Ω ∩ E 6= ∅, proving that Ω has full outer measure for ν¯ .
Let ν be the subspace measure on Ω induced from ν¯ , and let Σ denote its
domain. Then, as Ω has full outer measure for ν¯ , (Ω,Σ, ν) is a probability space.
Note that Nξ is a ν-null set in Ω for each ξ < ω1.
Now let f : A×Ω → A be defined by setting
f(x,y) = y(x), x ∈ A, y ∈ Ω.
Further, for each x ∈ A, let pix be the coordinate projection y , y(x) : AA → A.
Then, by definition of product measure, for each x ∈ A, pix is inverse-measure-
preserving for ν¯ and µ, and the family 〈pix〉x∈A is stochastically independent.
Evidently f(x, ·) agrees with pix on Ω for each x ∈ A, and since Ω has full
outer measure for ν¯ , it follows that for each x ∈ A, fx ≡ f(x, ·) is inverse-
measure-preserving for ν and µ, and that the family 〈fx〉x∈A is stochastically
independent. On the other hand, for each y ∈ Ω, fy is the same as y . Hence,
for each y ∈ Ω, fy is a fixed point free involution on A, and by what was noted
following the definition of the sets Nξ above, fy is inverse-measure-preserving
for µ. As was also noted above, given any E1, E2 ∈A, we have µ(E1∩φ−1ξ (E2)) =
µ(E1)µ(E2) for all but countably many ξ < ω1. By (c) in the definition of the
sets Nξ , this means that, given any E1, E2 ∈A, there is a countable D ⊂ω1 such
that whenever y ∈ Ω\⋃ξ∈DNξ then µ(E1∩f−1y (E2)) = µ(E1)µ(E2). As each Nξ is
a null set in Ω, it follows that, given any E1, E2 ∈A, we have µ(E1 ∩ f−1y (E2)) =
µ(E1)µ(E2) for almost all y ∈ Ω.
Taken together, these properties of f mean that f is a random matching
satisfying (P1) to (P4). By Remark 1 in Section 2, (P5) is also satisfied and, given
any type space (T ,T ) and type assignment θ : A→ T , (P6) to (P8) are satisfied as
well. Thus (a) and (b) of the theorem hold. By Proposition 2, (c) of the theorem
holds, and the choice of A shows that (d) is true. This completes the proof.
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6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The following notation will be used in the sequel.
Notation. If H is a subset of A × Ω then for x ∈ A, Hx denotes the x-section
of H, and for y ∈ Ω, Hy denotes the y-section of H. Thus, if x ∈ A, then
Hx = {y ∈ Ω : (x,y) ∈ H}; similarly, for y ∈ Ω, Hy = {x ∈ A : (x,y) ∈ H}.
For convenience, we first establish a lemma.
Lemma. Let (A,A, µ) and (Ω,Σ, ν) be probability spaces, and (A × Ω,Λ, λ) the
corresponding product probability space. Let M be the set of all M ⊂ A × Ω for
whichMx is a null set in Ω for almost all x ∈ A, andMy a null set in A for almost
all y ∈ Ω. Further, let 〈Ji〉i∈I be a family of sets, and 〈Hi,j〉i∈I,j∈Ji a family of
subsets of A×Ω. Suppose:
(a) For all x ∈ A and all y ∈ Ω, Hi,jx ∈ Σ and Hi,jy ∈A for each i ∈ I and j ∈ Ji.
(b) For each i ∈ I there is a real number αi > 0 such that whenever j1, . . . , jn
are finitely many distinct members of Ji, then given B ∈A,
µ(B ∩Hi,j1y ∩ · · · ∩Hi,jny ) = µ(B)αi2−n
for almost all y ∈ Ω, and given C ∈ Σ,
ν(C ∩Hi,j1x ∩ · · · ∩Hi,jnx ) = ν(C)αi2−n
for almost all x ∈ A.
(c) Hi,j ∩Hi′,j′ = ∅ whenever i 6= i′.
Then λ has a Fubini extension λ¯ such that M∪ {Hi,j : i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji} ⊂ Λ¯, writing
Λ¯ for the domain of λ¯.
Proof. Let F be the set of all those subsets F of A × Ω for which the integrals∫
A ν¯(Fx)dµ(x) and
∫
Ω µ¯(Fy)dν(y) are well-defined and equal, writing µ¯ and ν¯
for the completions of µ and ν respectively. Then F is a Dynkin class (i.e., ∅ ∈
F and F is closed under complements and countable disjoint unions) as may
easily be checked. In addition, (a) to (c) imply that whenever B1×C1, . . . , Bn×Cn
are finitely many measurable rectangles in A×Ω and F1, . . . , Fm are finitely many
elements ofM∪{Hi,j : i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji}, then the intersection
(B1 × C1)∩ · · · ∩ (Bn × Cn)∩ F1 ∩ · · · ∩ Fm
belongs to F . Therefore, by the monotone class theorem, there is a σ -algebra
Λ¯ ⊂ F which contains all measurable rectangles in A × Ω and all members
of M ∪ {Hi,j : i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji}. In particular, Λ ⊂ Λ¯. Define λ¯ : Λ¯ → R by setting
λ¯(F) = ∫A ν¯(Fx)dµ(x) for F ∈ Λ¯. Using the monotone convergence theorem, we
may see that λ¯ is a probability measure on A ×Ω. This completes the proof of
the lemma.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Using Maharam’s theorem, we can choose a countable
partition 〈Ai〉i∈I of A into non-negligible measurable sets so that for each i ∈ I
there is a family 〈F i,j〉j∈Ji of measurable subsets of A, with F i,j ⊂ Ai for all
j ∈ Ji, such that all of (i)–(iii) below hold, writing µi for the probability measure
on Ai obtained by normalizing the subspace measure induced by µ on Ai:
(i) For each i ∈ I, µi(F i,j) = 1/2 for all j ∈ Ji.
(ii) For each i ∈ I, the family 〈F i,j〉j∈Ji is stochastically independent for µi.
(iii) Denoting by A′ the sub-σ -algebra of A generated by {F i,j : i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji},
for any B ∈A there is a B′ ∈A′ such that B′ differs from B by a µ-null set.
For each i ∈ I and j ∈ Ji, let Hi,j = f−1(F i,j). We will show that the family
〈Hi,j〉i∈I,j∈Ji satisfies the conditions of the lemma above.
Clearly 〈Hi,j〉i∈I,j∈Ji satisfies (c) of these conditions. As earlier, write fx for
f(x, ·) and fy for f(·, y). Note that for each i ∈ I and j ∈ Ji, the sections Hi,jx
and Hi,jy satisfy
Hi,jx = f−1x (F i,j) and Hi,jy = f−1y (F i,j)
for all x ∈ A and y ∈ Ω respectively. Thus, in particular, (a) of the above lemma
is satisfied by the family 〈Hi,j〉i∈I,j∈Ji .
For each i ∈ I set αi = µ(Ai). Fix any i ∈ I, and let j1, . . . , jn be distinct
members of Ji. Note that (i) and (ii) imply:
(∗) µ(F i,j1 ∩ · · · ∩ F i,jn) = αi2−n.
Consider any B ∈ A. As f satisfies (P3) by hypothesis, for almost all y ∈ Ω
we have
µ(B ∩ f−1y (F i,j1 ∩ · · · ∩ F i,jn)) = µ(B)µ(F i,j1 ∩ · · · ∩ F i,jn).
Using this fact together with (∗), we may see that for almost every y ∈ Ω,
µ(B ∩Hi,j1y ∩ · · · ∩Hi,jny ) =µ
(
B ∩ f−1y (F i,j1)∩ · · · ∩ f−1y (F i,jn)
)
=µ(B ∩ f−1y (F i,j1 ∩ · · · ∩ F i,jn))
=µ(B)µ(F i,j1 ∩ · · · ∩ F i,jn)
=µ(B)αi2−n.
Now consider any C ∈ Σ. For each x ∈ A let Σx be the sub-σ -algebra of Σ gen-
erated by fx , and let ΣC be the sub-σ -algebra of Σ generated by C . By hypothesis,
f satisfies (P4), i.e., the family 〈Σx〉x∈A is stochastically independent. By Fremlin
(2008, 5A6-272W), it follows that there is a countable D ⊂ A such that for each
x ∈ A\D , ΣC and Σx are stochastically independent. Since (A,A, ν) is atomless
by hypothesis, this means that ΣC and Σx are stochastically independent for
almost every x ∈ A. Now for each x ∈ A, we have f−1x (F i,j1 ∩ · · · ∩ F i,jn) ∈ Σx ,
and it follows that for almost all x ∈ A,
ν
(
C ∩ f−1x (F i,j1 ∩ · · · ∩ F i,jn)
) = ν(C)ν(f−1x (F i,j1 ∩ · · · ∩ F i,jn)).
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Using this fact together with (∗) and the hypothesis that f satisfies (P2), i.e.,
that for each x ∈ A, fx is inverse-measure-preserving for µ and ν , we may
conclude that for almost all x ∈ A,
ν(C ∩Hi,j1x ∩ · · · ∩Hi,jnx ) =ν
(
C ∩ f−1x (F i,j1)∩ · · · ∩ f−1x (F i,jn)
)
=ν(C ∩ f−1x (F i,j1 ∩ · · · ∩ F i,jn))
=ν(C)ν(f−1x (F i,j1 ∩ · · · ∩ F i,jn))
=ν(C)µ(F i,j1 ∩ · · · ∩ F i,jn)
=ν(C)αi2−n.
Thus (b) of the above lemma is also satisfied by the family 〈Hi,j〉i∈I,j∈Ji .
Now let
G = {f−1(N) : N is a µ-null set in A}.
Then for each M ∈ G, and each x ∈ A, the section Mx is a ν-null set in Ω, by
the facts that M = f−1(N) implies Mx = f−1x (N) and fx is inverse-measure-
preserving. Also, by (P3) with E1 = A, for each M ∈ G, My is a µ-null set in A for
almost all y ∈ Ω.
We may now appeal to the lemma above to find a Fubini extension of λ such
that, denoting by Λ¯ its domain, Λ¯ contains every member of G and every member
of 〈Hi,j〉i∈I,j∈Ji . In view of (iii) above, it follows that f is (Λ¯,A)-measurable. This
completes the proof.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 1
(a) We have to show that whenever x1, . . . , xn are distinct members of A and
E1, . . . , En are members ofA, then
ν
(
f−1x1 (E1)∩ · · · ∩ f−1xn (En)
) = n∏
i=1
ν
(
f−1xi (Ei)
)
.
Thus let such x1, . . . , xn and E1, . . . , En be given. There is a finite partition P of
A into measurable subsets such that for each i = 1, . . . , n, Ei is the union of
members of P. Let the finite type space (T ,T ) be given by setting T = P and
T = 2P , and let the type assignment θ : A → T be the mapping that takes an
x ∈ A to that element of P which contains x. Evidently θ is (A,T )-measurable
and we have θ−1(θ(Ei)) = Ei for each i = 1, . . . , n. Now the hypothesis implies
that
ν
(
f−1x1 (θ
−1(θ(E1)))∩ · · · ∩ f−1xn (θ−1(θ(En)))
) = n∏
i=1
ν
(
f−1xi (θ
−1(θ(Ei)))
)
,
and since θ−1(θ(Ei)) = Ei for each i = 1, . . . , n, we have the desired conclusion.
(b) Consider any E1, E2 ∈ A. Let the type space (T ,T ) be given by setting
T = {0,1,2,3} and T = 2T , and let the type assignment θ : A → T be given by
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setting θ(x) = 0 for x ∈ E1\E2, θ(x) = 1 for x ∈ E1∩E2, θ(x) = 2 for x ∈ E2\E1,
and θ(x) = 3 for x ∈ A\(E1 ∪ E2). Then the hypothesis implies that there is a
ν-null set N ⊂ Ω such that for each y ∈ Ω\N ,
µ
(
θ−1({0,1})∩ f−1y (θ−1({1,2}))
) = µ(θ−1({0,1}))µ(θ−1({1,2})).
By the choice of θ, this means µ(E1∩f−1y (E2)) = µ(E1)µ(E2) for each y ∈ Ω\N .
(c) Fix any E ∈ A. Let (T ,T ) = ({0,1},2{0,1}) and let θ : A → T be given by
θ(x) = 1 if x ∈ E and θ(x) = 0 if x ∈ A\E. Then, for every x ∈ A, the hypothesis
implies ν
(
f−1x (θ−1({1}))
) = µ(θ−1({1})) and thus ν(f−1x (E)) = µ(E).
6.4 Proof of the claim in Remark 2
Suppose C ⊂ T is a countable algebra generating T and, for any y ∈ Ω and any
B1, B2 ∈ T , let Py(B1, B2) stand for the statement
“µ
(
θ−1(B1)∩ (θ ◦ fy)−1(B2)
) = τ(B1)τ(B2)."
Since C is countable, (P7) implies that there is a null set N ⊂ Y such that for any
y ∈ Ω\N , Py(B1, B2) is true for all B1, B2 ∈ C. Fix any y ∈ Ω\N and any B2 ∈ C.
The set
{
B1 ∈ T : Py(B1, B2) is true
}
is readily seen to be a monotone class, and
it follows that this set is T . As B2 was an arbitrary member of C, this means
that Py(B1, B2) is true for all B1 ∈ T and all B2 ∈ C. Now fix any B1 ∈ T . The set{
B2 ∈ T : Py(B1, B2) is true
}
is again a monotone class, and it follows that this
set is T . As B1 was an arbitrary member of T , it follows that Py(B1, B2) is true
for all B1, B2 ∈ T . Thus, as y was an arbitrary point in Ω\N , (P7’) holds.
7 Examples
Our paper provides foundations also to random matching models with infinitely
many types. This section provides examples that show this is very important.
Models with infinitely many types are not uncommon in economics. Examples 2
and 3 describe random matching models that require a continuum of types.
Example 4 shows what could go wrong if the notion of type is not appropriately
defined. It also clarifies that our existence result allows for a correct definition
of types also for models with infinitely many types.11
Example 2. Evolutionary Game Theory
In economics, most work of evolutionary game theory focuses on populations
of agents who are randomly matched to play a game with repeated rounds. In
these environments, types are identified with strategies. Thus, games with con-
tinuous strategy spaces involve random matching with a continuum of types.
Examples can be found in Sandholm (2001), Oechssler and Riedel (2002), Hof-
bauer et al. (2008). In these games, the distribution of strategies in the popu-
lation is given by a probability distribution on the strategy space S, written as
11Examples 3 and 4 are taken from Molzon and Puzzello (2009).
25
τ . Let R(s, s′) denote the payoff function to a player selecting strategy s when
his partner/opponent chooses strategy s′. Then, the expected payoff to a player
selecting strategy s is written as
E(s, τ) =
∫
S
R(s, s′)dτ(s′).
This expression makes implicit use of the types proportional law (P6) with a
continuum of types.
Example 3. Monetary Theory
We start by describing the aspects of the model of Molico (2006) (see also Zhu
(2005)) that are relevant to random matching. Time is discrete and the popula-
tion A = [0,1] consists of a continuum of infinitely lived agents whose discount
factor is β ∈ (0,1). Let τt(E) the measure of agents whose money holdings are
in E ⊂ [0,∞) at the beginning of period t. In this model, the agent’s type is
given by his money holdings, and thus there may be a continuum of types. In
every period agents are randomly and bilaterally matched. An agent is the buyer
in his match with probability α, the seller with probability α, and neither with
probability (1− 2α).
The trading rule is determined by means of Nash bargaining. We follow
Molico (2006) and denote by qt(mb,ms) and dt(mb,ms) the amount of out-
put and the amount of money determined by bargaining in a match where the
buyer hasmb money holdings and the seller hasms money holdings. Note that
the payoff only depends on types.
The expected lifetime utility of an agent who enters period t with m money
holdings is given by
Vt(m) =α
∞∫
0
{
u
[
qt(m,ms)
]+ βVt+1 [m− dt(m,ms)]}dτt(ms)
+α
∞∫
0
{−c [qt(mb,m)]+ βVt+1 [m+ dt(mb,m)]}dτt(mb)
+ (1− 2α)βVt+1(m).
The state of the system at any time is defined by the distribution τt , whose law
of motion depends on the proportion of sellers and the proportion of buyers.
With x denoting the proportion of buyers and sellers during a period, the law
of motion for the distribution of money in Molico (2006) can be written as
τt+1(B) =α
∫ ∫
mb−dt(mb,ms)∈B
dτt(mb)dτt(ms)
+α
∫ ∫
ms+dt(mb,ms)∈B
dτt(mb)dτt(ms)+ (1− 2α)τt(B).
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where the first and second terms are the measure of consumers and producers
whose post-trade money holdings are in B. The last term accounts for those
agents who do not trade and thus their money holdings remain in B.
The expressions above suggest that the expected payoff and the law of mo-
tion equations implicitly postulate a matching process that satisfies properties
(P6) and (P7) with a continuum of types.
Example 4. On the notion of type in economics
It is intuitive that if the notion of type in a random matching model does not
capture all payoff relevant characteristics of agents, then the model may fail to
give proper predictions on aggregate outcomes. We make this intuition precise
by providing a simple example with finitely many agents.
Suppose there is an even number of agents, say 8, of two types, “a” and “b.”
Denote the set of agents by
A = {a1, ..., a4, b1, ..., b4} .
Let MA denote the set of all possible matchings on this set of agents, and let
elements of MA be denoted by ϕ. The randomness of matching will be modeled
by placing a probability distribution on the set MA.
Each agent x ∈ A is endowed with a non-negative amount kx of some input.
Suppose that production of a certain good occurs only when agents of opposite
type meet, and that in this case the production of agent x depends on his input
and the input of the agent with whom agent x is matched. A simple specifi-
cation capturing such a complementarity of inputs is, denoting by Fx(ϕ) the
production amount of agent x given ϕ,
Fx(ϕ) =
{
f
(
min{kx, kϕ(x)}
)
if x and ϕ(x) have different types
0 if x and ϕ(x) have the same type,
where f : R+ → R+ is an increasing function with f(0) = 0.
We now consider two distinct probability distributions onMA. The two distri-
butions are described in the tables below, listing the matchings and correspond-
ing probabilities. Matchings that do not appear are assigned probability 0. The
notation (x,x′) is used to denote that agent x is paired with agent x′.
Distribution I
Matching Probability
(a1, a2)(a3, b3)(a4, b4)(b1, b2) .5
(a1, b1)(a2, b2)(a3, a4)(b3, b4) .5
Distribution II
Matching Probability
(a1, a2)(a3, b3)(a4, b4)(b1, b2) .25
(a1, a2)(a3, b1)(a4, b2)(b3, b4) .25
(a1, b1)(a2, b2)(a3, a4)(b3, b4) .25
(a1, b3)(a2, b4)(a3, a4)(b1, b2) .25
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Note that both distributions satisfy property (P6) (types proportional law) since
any individual agent has probability .5 of being matched with a type “a” agent
and probability .5 of being matched with a type “b” agent. Both distributions
also satisfy the types mixing property (P7) since for each listed matching, exactly
one-half of the type “a” agents are matched with type “a” agents and one-half
are matched with type “b” agents. Now, suppose that agents are given initial
endowments as described in the following table:
Input endowments
Agent a1 a2 a3 a4 b1 b2 b3 b4
Input 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
In the case of Distribution I, nothing can be produced. For both matchings, ei-
ther two agents of the same type are paired or a pair involves one agent with
0 resource. In the case of Distribution II, if one of the first three matchings is
realized, no production takes place because two agents of the same type meet
or agents of opposite type meet but one of them has 0. However if the fourth
matching is realized (and this occurs with probability .25) then agents a1, a2,
b3, and b4 all produce an amount f
(
min{1,1}) = f(1). Thus, if payoffs de-
pend on production output, these distributions could give rise to very different
predictions about expected aggregate outcomes.
Now as shown in Molzon and Puzzello (2010), if individual payoff functions
depend only on types, then the information contained in the types proportion-
ality property is all one needs to know about the matching process to make
predictions about expected aggregate payoff outcomes; in particular, these out-
comes do not depend on the actual choice of the random matching, i.e., the
distribution on the set of matchings (see Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 in Molzon and
Puzzello (2010)). The point in the example is that this is actually true only if the
notion of type includes all payoff relevant attributes of the agents; otherwise,
in addition to types proportionality, the choice of the random matching could
indeed be relevant. Now in models with a continuum of agents, infinitely types
could matter just because different agents could have different payoff relevant
attributes.12 If this is the case, then it is necessary to formulate the model in
terms of an infinite type space to avoid the problem that aggregate outcomes
could depend on the actual choice of the random matching. Our results provide
mathematical foundations to such models.
8 Concluding remarks
This paper provides existence and uniqueness results for random matchings
on continuum populations with infinitely many types. Our results suggest that
there is a trade-off between the choice of the measure space of agents and the
strength of the random matching properties one could hope for. In particular,
12See the introduction for references to such models.
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if one needs to model the population as a continuum endowed with Lebesgue
measure, then one should be ready to face impossibility results regarding de-
sirable properties of random matching (see Alós-Ferrer (1999)). However, if the
Lebesgue structure does not have substantive economic implications for the
model at hand, then our results can be interpreted as providing solid founda-
tions to a large class of random matching models, including those with infinitely
many types.
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